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The effects of Donald Trump
Toby S. James
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ABSTRACT
What effect did Donald Trump have within and beyond America?
This article assesses the policy impact of the President using the
new layered framework for understanding the impact of political
leaders, which considers their effect on the connected layers of
societal structures, political institutions and policy. Firstly, the
article extends the framework with a new typology of change.
Secondly, it draws from the empirical articles in this volume to
map his effects under the new typology and the layered
approach. Trump is found to have largely acted as an accelerant
for already existing causal processes in society, rather than
providing a radical break with past politics in many areas. By
undermining democratic institutions and encouraging hyper-
partisanship within political institutions, for example, he was
strengthening prevailing causal forces rather than constructing
new forces. However, there were some more substantial
effects such as the reversal of progress towards racial equality. In
the layer of policy, he crucially failed to slow or reverse
destructive pressures on the economy and public health or even
fulfil major campaign promises on healthcare. Overall, Trump
illustrates neither the strength nor weakness of the office of
presidency, but instead the dangers of poor political leadership
to citizens in America and beyond, especially in times of crisis.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 9 September 2021





To what extent did Donald Trump bring about transformational change? As the intro-
duction to this special issue explained, both his strongest proponents and critics
were in agreement that he considerably altered society in America and beyond. The
counter-argument, however, is that given the huge complexity of social life and the mul-
tiple forces for continuity and change, the office holder of a single governmental office is
always likely to have a limited impact. This limited impact thesis would hold that Trump
was therefore likely to be no different, despite the dramatic tweets, the showbiz and
breaks with the conventions of the presidency. No one individual is capable of shaping
history in quite this way. They tend to themselves be products of the broader times.
In this article, we test this limited impact thesis by drawing upon the research findings
delivered in this volume. But first, the article further develops concepts to help us under-
stand the nature of change on policy that political leaders can bring about. The opening
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introductory article to this volume has, of course, already specified a framework for
understanding political change (James 2021). A layered framework for mapping
change was set out based around critical realism. The argument was that rather than
focussing more narrowly on electoral outcomes, the political regime or the personal
characteristics of the leader, we should embrace complexity. A layered framework was
mapped out where we can separate the impact on societal structure, political institutions
and policy areas. The approach then encourages us to identify how each is connected and
inter-related through structure and agency relationships. The impact of a political leader
in each area can then be mapped.
This helps us to consider where we are looking. It also gives clues about how to look for
change –mixed methods are arguably important given the ontological and epistemologi-
cal premises of critical realism. But it does not explain how to measure change. The article
therefore begins by reviewing the literature on policy change, before setting out some
preferred conceptual vocabulary for measuring change by drawing and adapting from
critical realism. It then draws from the research articles in the special issue to identify
the type and nature of change that President Trump instigated.
Existing measures of policy change
There are several existing approaches within the policy sciences that seek to measure the
extent of policy change. One approach is to focus on the de jure change that takes place in
stated policies. The work by Peter Hall (1993) is one of the most commonly cited, who
distinguished three layers of possible policy change according to the level of severity. This
was based on an analysis of policy change in UK economic policy. First order change
involved the adjusting existing levers and instruments with the aim of meeting existing
targets. Second order change involved the changing of the policy instruments, but still
keeping the hierarchy of goals (282). Third order change involved jettisoning the
policy paradigm entirely and a radical shift in their hierarchy of goals. A profound
sense of failure can bring about a radical switch in policy beliefs and rules.
This is undoubtedly helpful in identifying a change in tack in the policy levers being
used by a leader. It has the weakness that it does not enable the actual outcomes of these
changes to be measured. A leader might alter their approach to a policy issue, but if it
has no effect, then does it matter? An alternative approach has therefore been to focus
on the de facto changes that have been brought about. Scholars who have done this
introduce concepts for characterizing the nature or extent of change within their
overall frameworks. For example, the punctuated equilibrium model claims that
change is incremental in most cases, but this can then be followed by “seismic”
change (Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Theorists using the advocacy coalition frame-
work distinguish between minor and major changes as well. Minor changes are
those emanating from “policy orientated learning” while major changes involve a
switch in core policy beliefs. This is often the results of external events or a major
policy failure (Flores-Crespo and Mendoza Cazarez 2019; Sabatier 1988). Different
types of institutional change are identified by Mahoney and Thelen (2010), who dis-
tinguish between institutional layering, drift, conversion, and displacement. There is
also a separate literature focussing on policy success. This acknowledges that leaders
do not have complete control over the world and change does not immediately
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result from new policies (Boyne 2003). Marsh and McConnell (2010), for example,
differentiate between process, political and a programme success.
Causality in scientific/critical realism
The critical realist approach also has a specific theory of causation (also see: Kurki 2007;
Sayer 2010, 103–117). Given that the introduction to this volume has already developed a
layered framework for understanding policy change built around critical realism, it is
necessary to outline a theory of causation for the layered framework based on critical
realism. This can help us understand the causal impact of political leaders. Critical
realism claims that:
. Causes exist as real forces in the world as generative mechanisms independent of
human knowledge about them. This contrasts with interpretivists and other post-posi-
tivists who tend to dispense with causal explanations (see, for example Bevir and
Blakely 2018).1
. The world and statements about it (ontology) cannot be reduced to our knowledge of
it (epistemology), because most can be observed can exist independently of a particu-
lar observer. There are therefore a much greater variety and breadth of causal mech-
anisms than we might initially be aware of and some causal processes may be not
readily observable (Bhaskar 2008, 12–56).
. There are complex relationships between objects, causal mechanisms and outcomes,
which means that causes do not work on a “when A, then B” manner. Causal mech-
anisms have generative powers but they are not always activated in a given setting.
This is because humans have individual agency and can therefore respond reflectively
and engage in strategic learning.
. Causal mechanisms can come in multiple forms including the reasoning of agents,
norms, social structures and discourses.
. At any moment, social structure exists prior to agents, but human agency is necessary
for the reproduction and transformation of social structure.2
Through the critical realist lens, causal mechanisms are crucial to understanding social
events. But the situation is much more complicated because human knowledge of causal
mechanisms, can, change their nature. Agents are therefore themselves causal forces,
involved in an interplay of strategic matrix.
Leadership concepts for the layered framework
Concepts from critical realism provide a meta-theory for understanding the political
change that leaders can bring. However, they do not provide bespoke and more
applied concepts that can help us to discuss political leaders’ causal effects in more con-
crete situations, such as an analysis of Donald Trump’s presidency. We can, however,
attempt this here:
. There are already prevailing causal forces and currents within a political system. Many
of these prevailing forces exist through causal mechanisms that exist prior to and
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be independent of the leader. There have been long-term trends towards an ageing
society in America (Super 2020), rising economic inequality (Kuhn, Schularick, and
Steins 2020) and climate change (IPCC 2018). They would also include discourses,
which are ideational in nature, but which still have causal effects (for example,
racist discourses have the power to recreate and continue forms of racism).
. Once in office (and sometimes before), leaders will be in structure and agency relation-
ships with existing prevailing forces. The extent to which they can shape them will vary
by context. Prevailing causal forces will often be strong and the leader may be almost
entirely unable to alter them that they will continue as if they are entirely independent
of the leader (e.g. a leader of an overseas mirco-state would normally struggle to shape
US agricultural policy). In other cases, leaders will have immense opportunities to
change prevailing forces because of strategic opportunities and knowledge.
. Many prevailing causal forces are not always observable and mixed research methods
are needed to understand them. Alternative causal logics such as that of retroduction
could also be applied to help identify existing prevailing causal forces (Belfrage and
Hauf 2016).
. Causal forces do not always have the same effect in every context because different
actors can adopt different political strategies, understand the situation differently or
“play the game” differently. Put more simply, the effects differ precisely because con-
texts are different; they are not like the closed systems of natural science experiments.
Different contexts constrain and enable what can be done, and with what
effect. Prevailing forces therefore exist without the leader, but the nature of a causal
force may take a different form without their existance.
. The nature of causal forces can also change when leaders and other actors become
aware of them. For example, if political leaders begin to think that “globalization” is
occurring then they might use the term to justify changes adopt policies to slow it.
However, once the idea of “globalization” enters public discourse the meanings that
people attach to it and the leader who used the term to instigate those changes can
be re-articulated and changed. Leaders may therefore experience causal mechanisms
differently (for example, on “globalisation” see: Watson and Hay 2003).
. Causal mechanisms come in many forms including economic, social, political forces,
the power norms of behaviour, the effects of institutions, policies but also leaders and
other actors too. Leaders are able to have an effect on the causal mechanisms that are
causing trends because they have control over certain policy levers and can also encou-
rage changes in behaviours.
. It is commonly the case that social life is characterized by stability rather than change.
However, even in stability is itself the result of forces and pressures. Equilbirumsmight
be reached or forces for stability. Forces of path dependency and lock in effects can
make institutions and policies difficult to change. Analysing whether leaders create
new patterns of stability of unlock change are is therefore important.
Given that leaders enter political systems where there are already rivers of causation
flowing, the critical question for the layered approach is to what extent are leaders respon-
sible for changing these causal forces, or introducing new forces? What would the world
have looked like, if they had not acted? It is suggested here that we might initially envisage
six possible types of change:
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. Birth – they might create new causal forces which previously did not exist.
. Accelerate – they accentrate, strengthen and thicken the force of existing forces.
. Slow – they might reduce the power of causal forces.
. Stop – they might entirely cease existing causal forces.
. Reconfigure – they might qualitatively change the nature of causal forces.
. Redirect – they might make a minor adjustment to the nature of causal forces.
Some of these forms of change are more important than others. In the interests of par-
simony, it may be possible to further simplify this and consider whether, for each layer a
leader has instigated:
- No change
- Minor change – acceleration or slowing of existing forces of causation.
- Major change – change in path and direction of causation in the area.
- Seismic change – the construction of new causal forces.
We should also consider the strength and importance of these forces in our assess-
ments. Making minor changes to the causal mechanisms that define how democratic
America is or the nature of capitalism is muchmore significance than more inconsequen-
tial changes new forces at the margins of public policy.
Did Donald Trump bring major change?
With the layered framework in mind, and multiple swirling causal forces and actors in
place, what was the nature and extent of the Trump effect? This can be discussed
using each of the three layers.
Societal structure
The articles in this volume painted a picture of the societal structure and the ongoing
causal forces before Trump took the presidency. Democracy and democratic ideals
were already experiencing pressures, Foa and Mounk (2021) wrote, through newly estab-
lished patterns of behaviour including rising polarization, a “tit-for-tat” cycle of consti-
tutional hard balling, denying the mandate of election winners and political intolerance.
Trump and his supporters often claimed that there was a “deep state” which sought to
work against the President and the reforms that he wanted to instigate. Horwitz
(2021) argued that although the American state was never neutral and open to manipu-
lation by powerful parties and capitalist economic system, there was no deep state or
administrative state working against his interests as Trump described. For Keck and
Clua Losada, the main feature of the state was its capitalist structure, where capitalist pol-
itical and economic interests have greater sway and the system has causal processes in
place to generate greater economic inequalities over time. American society has been
increasingly polarizing since the 1980s as a result of patterns of socialization, shifts in
identity, economic and technological transformations (Iyengar 2021). The advent of
social media has made accessing reliable information challenging and led many to
POLICY STUDIES 759
argue that we have entered an age of post-truth (Hannan 2018). Racism remained a per-
sistent force in America.
The volume showed how Trump accelerated existing causal mechanisms so that they
further undermined American social fabric. Trump was often criticized for undermining
American democracy. Assessing this claim, Foa and Mounk (2021) pointed to some of
the President’s actions which did undermine democratic processes. His willingness to
violate democratic norms and his provocative personal approach further fuelled a tran-
sition in the United States from a clean democracy to what they consider a “dirty democ-
racy”. Trump gave signals of endorsement to non-state actors such as “Proud Boys”,
which encouraged violent vigilantism and gave qualified condemnation of right-wing
extremists gathering in Charlottesville. This transition was already in progress before
Trump became President, they write. That said, Trump’s implicit acceptance and incite-
ment of vigilantism were unique for the presidency. It “may well prove to be his most
damaging legacy for American democratic life” (14).
Hodson (2021) argued that Trump strengthened moves towards a post-truth society
by showing “an indifference to fact checking” and would commonly make false or mis-
leading claims. He also had “an aversion to policy analysis and disruptive approach to
political norms and past policy commitments” (10). But neither was Trump the first
post-truth presidency, he noted.
Confidence in government and state institutions was undermined by the president
too. Trump’s false claims about the “deep state” would “fuel the fury of his supporters
and mobilize their partisanship” (4) and “undermined confidence in government and
the legitimacy of the state” (1), Horwitz claimed. A majority of Republicans later believed
that the 2020 election was rigged against President Trump and enough felt so strongly
that they stormed the Capitol building. But trust in government was low before
Trump was in office – and it was always lower among members of the party that does
not control presidency. But following his departure from office, only 9% of Republican
leaning citizens had trust in government (Pew 2021).
Political polarization had been an ongoing theme in American politics for some time
(Benkler, Faris, and Roberts 2018). Keck and Clua Losada argued that Trump extended
this, however, by using the border to polarize opinion by appealing to far-right groups in
the US that had fears surrounding immigration and are concerned that immigrants
threaten traditional (White) culture. This was also brought about by Trump’s approach
to the Republican party (Espinoza 2021).
Trump further engrained racial inequality into the American social structure. As
McClain (2021) noted there is a rich work identifying the structural inequality and injus-
tices in American society, which had long existed prior to Trump coming to office
(Sørensen 1996; Young 2010). These ran along dimensions including race, gender,
class and across intersectionalities (Crenshaw 2017). Trump made no pretence to
reduce racial inequalities, McClain (2021) showed. His actions were instead to reinforce
and extend racial inequality, either through his policies, appointments or rhetoric. More-
over, he supported voter suppression efforts which systematically undermined the politi-
cal power of minority groups and launched a new attack against Critical Race Theory.
There was an increase in the number of hate crimes against people of colour and immi-
grants reported to the police after Trump’s election (Edwards and Rushin 2018). There
was also an increase in reported hate crimes in counties that hosted Trump rallies
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(Feinberg, Branton, and Martinez-Ebers 2019) – and the effects spread across the globe
(Giani and Méon 2021). Other actors contributed towards racial inequality and Trump
did not birth this causal force, but he was more than an accelerant – he reversed progress
that had been made and reconfigured the nature of racism by introducing new conven-
tions such as not disassociating the presidency from extreme groups and introducing new
terminology into public discourse such as referring to covid-19 as the “Chinese virus”
(Viala-Gaudefroy and Lindaman 2020).
The Trump effect was therefore divisive and unsettling to social structures and politi-
cal cohesion. But where Trump was argued to have generated some stability was within
capitalist structures. The financial crisis of 2007/8 further open divisions in society, which
states sought to respond to with austerity measures. Authoritarian neoliberalism, as Bruff
(2014) involved attempts by states to insulate themselves from unpopular austerity
decisions. Keck and Clua Losada argue that Trump deepened the form of contemporary
US capitalism. Trump introduced measures such as tax cuts which mainly benefitted
multi-national companies. There was also a deregulated economy with labour market
reforms including the end of US Department of Labor rules on overtime pay. Trump,
however, used the border wall instrumentally to focus voter’s attention on migrants
and the border as a threat to national security and economic wellbeing. He thereby
diverted attention away from the effects of the neoliberal reforms. Capitalism is an intrin-
sically unstable institution and Trump thereby stabilized capitalism and capitalist
accumulation. This represented good political statecraft, in some respects.
Political institutions
In the domain of political institutions, Trump’s clearest significant impact could be found
in the judiciary where he made widespread appointments and re-established a conserva-
tive majority in the Supreme Court. Nemacheck (2021) set out how the president was
enormously successful at making appointments to the judiciary that would be politically
favourable to his conservative cause. This included three justices to the US Supreme
Court, 54 United States Circuit Court of Appeals judges, and 174 federal District
Court judges. By comparison, Barack Obama, during his eight years in office, only
made 55 appointments. The effect would be extended by the fact that Trump appointed
many young people to the federal courts. The average age was 47. Lifelong tenure would
ensure a long last impact on the judicial system, which would feed through to policy.
Given the strength of this arm of the state, this would be dramatic. The appointments
were also more brazenly partisan. Conservative groups were used to help Trump shortlist
possible candidates, and the appointment process much more politicized with McCon-
nell. Bomberg (2021) noted that the judicial appointments to the supreme court could
have lasting environmental effects. The conservative majority-led court could, for
example, revisit the 2007 decision Massachusetts v EPA which has enabled the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gases (5). This tilting of the judicial system therefore birthed a
new of causal processes, albeit one that had been present in US politics in the very
recent past. The Supreme Court had a 4–4 conservative-liberal split when Trump
came to power, after the death of Justice Scalia, before which there was already a 5–4 con-
servative majority. Trump restored the majority and strengthened it for years to come
with a 6–3 balance.
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Changes also came in the Whitehouse, Congress and Republican Party. Hodson
(2021) noted how pictures revealed extensively male-dominated executive decision-
making, as seven male advisors were photographed watching Trump signing an executive
order in January 2017 that prevented organizations in receipt of global health assistance
from the United States from performing or promoting abortion (11), illustrating patri-
archal relations. Decision-making was increasingly dominated by men inside the
Whitehouse.
Smith (2021) showed how Trump inflamed hyper-partisanship within Congress,
which led to extended government shutdowns. Smith blamed Trump for instigating
the 2019 shutdown in support of his campaign pledges, which were a “fringe view and
understanding of immigration and border control” (10). Intense partisanship was not
new, and followed a pattern set in course since the 1990s in the “politics of anger”
during Newt Gingrich’s “Republican Revolution”, after taking control of Congress in
the 1994 midterms. But it reached a new level under Trump. The same was true of the
dynamics of the Republican party. Espinoza (2021) argued that Trump’s electoral
campaigns and term as president were largely a continuation of forces that were
already present within the GOP. The evolution of the conservative tradition within
the party had been taking part over many years. The Tea Party provided Trump
with a congressional base and had already set down similar policy positions on issue
such as Affordable Care Act (ACA), immigration and Mexican the border, socio-
moral values (e.g. on abortion and gay marriage), hostility towards Muslims and
Islam, anti-benefit recipient rhetoric, and questioning the legitimacy of Obama as pre-
sident. Nonetheless, he pushed the party rightwards, made it more dependent on white
support and more openly hostile to democracy. He also gave the more extreme
elements of Republican conservatism a major stage in US politics. There was therefore
an acceleration of an existing trend.
Domestic policy
In the sphere of domestic policy, the most unprecedented external causal force during the
Trump presidency was the spread of covid-19. The virus was first reported in Wuhan,
China on 8 January 2020 (Wee and McNeil 2021). On 21 January 2020, the first case
was reported in the USA, after a man in his 30s from Snohomish County, Washington,
developed symptoms following a journey from the Wuhan region (Rabin 2020). There
would be 24,028,007 cases in America by the day that Trump left office (WHO 2021).
Kapucu and Moynihan (2021) argued that the US had the “capacity, resources, expertise,
plans, and policies to deal with pandemic crises effectively”, however, President Trump
was an important contributing factor in the failure of the US to do so. He showed a failure
of crisis leadership, crisis decision making, communication, a lack of coordination and
collaboration, and of crisis control. The result was to undermine the credibility of the
federal government and create a false sense of security amongst many of his supporters.
This contributed towards the avoidable death of many of the four million people who
died of Covid during Trump’s time in office. If we were to consider the spread of the
virus as a causal process, he did not sufficiently slow this as well as he might have done.
In terms of macro-economic management, he was also ineffective at shaping causal
processes. Born et al. (2021) used a synthetic model to evaluate Trump’s overall effect
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on the economy. Trump came into office with a booming economy and there were there-
fore already strong causal forces for economic growth. There were also strong forces for
economic turmoil as a result of the pandemic. During his time in office, Trump sought to
promote the economy by passing major policy changes such as the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act, as well as a major stimulus package in the form of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security (CARES) Act. Their analysis at the aggregate level of the
economy (rather than evaluating specific policies) found Trump to have largely had
no effect on GDP, employment, the labour force and unemployment rates. The real
US economy largely tracked the synthetic doppelganger. This changed, however,
during the pandemic. During the end of Trump’s time in office, 2020Q4, the real US
economy outmatched the synthetic model on GDP, but the situation was dramatically
worse for the employment, the labour force, and unemployment rates. The US took a
different approach to countries such as the UK who provided furlough schemes.
Trump’s inaction therefore failed to slow the economic turmoil generated by the pan-
demic. In a sense, Trump did nothing to shape economic currents, which swept their
way through America as if the President wasn’t there.
There were other areas where Trump did little to nothing. As Smith noted, Trump
campaigned on the issue of repealing “Obama-care” but struggled in his efforts to over-
haul the Affordable Care Act, and hence did little to change health care. The same was
partially true of his other campaign pledge to “build a wall”. The construction of a
“border wall” was potentially a major change in the flows of citizens, but as Keck and
Clua Losada noted, the wall was incomplete as he left office and over 1000 km had
some form of fencing already in place before his term started (Giles 2021). The
number of immigrants continued to rise under Trump, albeit more slowly, although
there were also changes in the composition of migrant flows. There were fewer refugees
and immigration fell away entirely after Trump announced “complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States” as the President used the policy levers available
to him (Lowther 2020). As Keck and Clua Losada note, the symbolism and rhetoric
may have been more important. But the long-term trends of Americans becoming
increasingly be in favour of immigration continued (Gallup 2021). Photographs captured
the human impact of Trump’s policies, as Hodson (2021) illustrated. The promise to sep-
arate parents from children in cases where families had Southwest border illegally dev-
astated the lives of many.
Bomberg (2021) outlined how Trump set out to make major changes to environ-
mental policies. There were organizational reforms and policy changes which restricted
funding for scientific research and appointed key personnel who were hostile towards
environmental protection. In terms of our model, Trump therefore acted as an accelerant
to global warming by taking some of the brakes off. Many of his reforms could be quickly
flipped once Biden took office, Bomberg argued. However, in the domain of ideas, Trump
had a more profound change. Trump sort to undermine confidence in science, expertise
and government; he painted environmental protection as “job killing”; stressed the
importance of America; and encouraged white male grievance in rust-belt states to be
directed at environmental protection. Trump thereby disrupted discursive institutional
processes, which were cutting the brakes on global warming and environmental
degradation.
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Trump had a significant impact in the area of LBGTQ policies. Pepin-Neff and Cohen
(2021) argued that Donald Trump acted as a moral entrepreneur by sending tweets
claiming transgender Americans could not serve the US military. This not only triggered
a moral panic and set the issue onto the agenda, but also acted to change policy, they
argue. In so doing, a new causal process could have been argued to have been set off
by the President because the moral panic “spread exclusion, fear, untrue stereotypes,
and second-class citizenship in ways that boost transphobia and mobilize transphobic
extremism” (1). At the same time, exclusion, fear and transphobia were already
present in American society, and Trump’s actions seemed to have served as more of
an accelerant than have given birth to transphobia. But the effects would reach into
societal structure.
International policy
International policy has been central to the study of the presidency because of the might
of American superpower and the widely held view that this is where the president holds
greater power. The power that the US holds, however, has often been thought to be
diminishing in relative terms because of the rise of powers such as Brazil, Russia,
India and China (Nadkarni and Noonan 2013; Xinbo 2018). Trubowitz and Harris
(2019) have instead pointed to the role of domestic level factors: (i) the rise of hyper-par-
tisanship in Washington which has eroded confidence in the president (ii) the absence of
a compelling foreign policy narrative to unite the country and (iii) the erosion of the
social contract because of the increasing vulnerability for workers. A crucial component
of power, Kim and Knuckey (2021) argued in this volume, is soft power. The president
thereby added to already existing causal forces that were threatening US supremacy by
reducing US soft power through his leadership style. They argued that Trump’s leader-
ship style was very different from previous presidents with many unexpected actions such
as unconventional speeches, offhand remarks and unilateral foreign policies. They traced
Trump’s popularity overseas, as well as attitudes towards America. Respondents tended
to view Trump’s leadership negatively, with perceptions about his personality, and his
policies on the environment, immigration, Iran deal, trade relations, and religion
being important in determining citizens’ views. This undermined American soft
power. Winning over “hearts and minds” has often been a key pillar of foreign policy
with foreign aid and cultural exchange programmes often being used to support this
goal. A more recent survey, reported by Pew in January 2020, reported that 64% had
no confidence in Trump and 38% had unfavourable views of the US in Pew Research
Center (2020, 3). This compared to 23% having no confidence in Obama and 26%
having unfavourable views of the US when citizens were polled in 2016 as the former Pre-
sident’s 8-year term in office began to draw to a close (Pew Research Center 2017, 3).
Given that many citizens overseas will associate the US with the president, even after
he departed office, this seems likely to bring a lasting legacy.
Trump also reshaped relationships with the wider world. Rolf (2021) showed that
Trump developed a foreign policy which borrowed from the old, in that it drew from
Jacksonianism and Jeffersonianism and had some continuities with Obama. However,
it was also something new in that it involved a unique combination of both traditions.
Ashbee and Hurst (2021) argued that there was a paradigmatic shift in the US
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relationship with China after Trump assumed power in January 2017. Trump took a
more hostile approach towards China, which involved imposing trade tariffs. There
was, however, support for this across both sides of the political aisle and the public
had become more critical too. There were also signs of continuity in the early days of
the Biden administration. Discursive institutional forces had changed considerably –
with Trump partially responsible for this. There were fewer clear-cut changes in the
power balances over policy and institutional architecture for policymaking. He also dee-
pened the US–India defence relationship, Ashbee and Hurst (2021, 11) argue. However,
the transatlantic relationship was threatened with trust undermined by his actions.
Although there had been problematic trends and periodic crises in the past, Nielson
and Dimitrova (2021) argued, Trump’s whole approach to transatlantic relations
created a crisis of trust unlike any seen before and set America on a path further away
from European powers.
There were also elements of continuity in international policy, however. Shively
(2021) argued that Donald Trump’s election to the position of commander-in-chief
could have marked a major break with past policy. The reality, however, was that cyber-
security policy was constrained by existing strategic frameworks. Trump developed a
“defend forward” cybersecurity policy, which aimed to be pre-emptive against emerging
new cyber threats. But ultimately, he reached for more traditional military and economic
policy tools when threats emerged. This was “a modification of, rather than a break with,
prior cybersecurity policies” and this highlighted the unlikelihood of change.
Conclusion: the impact of Donald Trump
To conclude and summarize, we can now return to some of the opening questions of the
volume. We asked whether the Trump administration marked a radical departure in
American government, policy and governance? Was the Trump administration transfor-
mationalist in any area? What were the consequences of the Trump administration’s
policies?
It has been argued that the answers that we derive are dependent on the frameworks
that we use. A layered approach was introduced at the outset to try and capture the full
complexity of the effects and how they might interact. Individual articles have set out his
effects across many areas across and within the layers. There was undoubtedly a change
in the style and tone of presidential leadership, with many of the norms of the office cast
aside. There was also the development of a series of alternative policies to his predecessor.
But the key test is what effect this all had.
At the level of societal structures, Trump was found to have largely acted as an accel-
erant for already existing causal processes in society, rather than providing a radical break
with past politics. Nonetheless, his actions undermined democracy, truth and confidence
in state institutions amongst much of the American population. He further polarized
social cleavages and inflamed race relations. Although he was only an accelerant, these
are not small forces to be playing with and it is difficult to foresee the longer-term
effects. Like adding petrol to fire, there is a point at which the blaze becomes very
difficult to control and there could be a longer-term degradation in America’s social
fabric, especially if Trumpist movements push the cause further, the Republican base
continue to generate new leaders of a similar vein and use the same rhetoric, or
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Trump himself returns to office. His effects on racism and racial inequality were also
more profound, where he reversed and reconfigured causal forces.
Trump also consolidated and accelerated partisan norms of behaviour within political
institutions. Debates with Congress became rawer and more raucous. Appointments for
the judiciary more explicitly partisan in nature. The rigidity of the American consti-
tutions protected political institutions from further change, however. In the layer of
policy, he failed to slow or reverse causal pressures on the economy and public health.
His economic policies didn’t have the effects of promoting growth that it aimed to –
and the economy struggled to recover during the pandemic without the stronger
support found in many European states. He also contributed towards America being
unable to slow the pace of the spread of the virus. Major campaign promises failed to
turn into law because of his poor congressional relations and leadership. Many other pol-
icies may be short-lived in their effects because of the power of the Biden administration
to repeal them. Internationally, he undermined US soft power and fractured trust with
strategic transatlantic partners. This might be partially changeable by alternative
leaders, but Trump would be remembered.
What are the broader lessons of the nature of presidential power over policy in
America and beyond? It is important to note that although this volume has been exten-
sive in covering many policy areas, it has not been exhaustive. As the layered framework
set out, there will have been many effects around the world and not everything can there-
fore be captured in a single volume. For example, it has been well documented that
Trump’s rise was used politically by parties of the far-right in other countries. Those
parties also were hit by a negative impact when Trump lost (Turnbull-Dugarte and
Rama 2021). What of his effects on Africa? This volume has also not been a comparative
study which would have enabled us to measure impact against another president. Fur-
thermore, it is also difficult to know the longer lasting effects of a president because,
although immediate evaluations are important, hindsight will give the advantage to
future authors.
We can, however, specify the nature of the Presidential impact based on the case study
areas surveyed. This was mostly to accelerate existing causal forces. But the effects on
racism were more profound, and his failure to contribute towards successful manage-
ment of the pandemic show that, even though executive office holder is not necessarily
provided a strong set of levers, poor leadership does have profound effects.
Moreover, his presidency does also demonstrates the utility of using the layered fra-
mework for understanding the impact of political leaders. Political leaders’ effects can
be diverse are not limited to political regimes or electoral politics. Capturing the com-
plexity of these effects should be a central concern for policy studies. The conceptual
tools developed in this volume should be therefore be helpful to assess the effect of
other political leaders, within and beyond America.
Notes
1. There is a contradiction in focussing on the role of ideas, but not considering how these
ideas take the form of discourses to become causally efficacious, in affecting how people
think and act. It follows that critical realists should identify how these discourses become
widespread, who (if anyone) creates them and for what purposes.
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2. It is important to note that there are more detailed steps in the conceptual development of
the structure and agency relationship in the strategic relational approach. See Jessop (2005,
48–53). This is deliberately simplified here.
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